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SURVEY SECTION
Products Liability. Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d
712 (R.I. 1999). Under section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, adopted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, manufactur-
crs and sellers of component parts may be proper defendants in
product liability suits.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Americo C. Buonanno, III (Buonnano) worked for
New England Ecological Development, Inc. (NEED), a recycling
transfer station in Johnston, Rhode Island.' Although he was a
relatively new employee, he held the position of supervisor.2
Buonanno was involved in a workplace accident when he at-
tempted to fix a conveyor belt that was running off track.3 While
up on a catwalk, he lost his balance and fell onto the conveyor belt
system.4 His arm was caught and crushed in the "nip point" of the
conveyor.5 The nip point did not have a guard, which probably
would have prevented an injury.6 In fact, three weeks prior to the
accident, an OSHA inspector visited the NEED facility and warned
NEED that guards should be installed.7 An unguarded nip point is
undisputedly a workplace danger.8 As a result of the accident,
Buonanno's right arm was amputated at the elbow. 9
The conveyor belt upon which Buonanno was injured was nec-
essary to transport rubbish inside the plant.'0 NEED hired a
welder to construct the system from a variety of component
parts." These parts were bought from Colmar Belting Company
1. See Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 713 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that a nip point was "cre-
ated where the conveyor belt moves over the stationary portion of the conveyor-
belt system, or the 'wing pulley.' The wing pulley prevents waste materials from
getting caught between the roller and the belt." Id. at 713 n.1.
6. See id. at 714.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 713.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 714.
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(Colmar), a distributor, who purchased the parts from Emerson
Power Transmission Corporation (EPT), a manufacturer. 12
Buonanno sued both Colmar and EPT, alleging that Colmar
and EPT were responsible for his injury because the nip point did
not have a safety guard that would have prevented his arm from
being caught. 13 In his complaint, Buonanno prayed that Colmar
and EPT would be found strictly liable or, in the alternative, negli-
gent for defective design of the system. 14 Both Colmar and EPT
argued that they had no duty to supply or manufacture a guard for
the wing pulley since the system was custom-made by the NEED
welder.15
Buonanno amended his complaint to include claims for defec-
tive design of the wing pulley and failure to warn of its dangerous
nature.16 Before the case could reach trial, EPT filed a motion for
summary judgment.' 7 EPT rested its motion on the fact that com-
ponent part manufacturers do not have a duty to ensure the safety
of the final integrated product, and did not challenge the existence
of a defect.' 8 Colmar joined EPT's motion, and also argued that it
could not be held liable for Buonanno's injury because it did not
manufacture or design any component part.19 Buonanno re-
sponded by arguing that a duty did exist on the part of Colmar and
EPT. In addition, Buonanno argued that the defendants' failed to
employ a reasonable alternative design of the wing pulley that
would have reduced the chance of injury.20
The trial justice granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment, holding that a manufacturer or distributor of a compo-
nent part is not liable for injury caused by the final integrated
product.21 In so holding, the trial justice relied on Moor v. Iowa
Manufacturing Company.22 In Moor, South Dakota's highest court
held that in order to hold a component parts manufacturer liable in
12. See id.
13. See id. at 713.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 714.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 715.
21. See id.
22. 320 N.W.2d 927 (S.D. 1982).
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products liability, the plaintiff must prove that the product was de-
fective at the time it left the manufacturer's control, rendering the
product unreasonably dangerous. 23 The trial justice noted that be-
cause Buonanno did not present any evidence on this issue, there
was no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved.24 The trial
judge did not address Buonanno's reasonable alternative design
argument.25 Buonanno appealed. 26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Justice Goldberg's Opinion
Justice Goldberg recognized that Buonanno's claim for liabil-
ity of a component part manufacturer had ample support in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts (the Restatement Third).27 Section 5
of the Restatement Third provides that a component part seller or
distributor can be liable for product-caused harm, if (1) the product
is defective itself, or (2) if the seller or distributor substantially
participates in the integration of the component part into the prod-
uct.28 In either case, the plaintiff must show that the product de-
fect caused the harm, and in the latter case, the plaintiff must also
show that the integration of the component part caused the prod-
uct to be defective. 29
After expressly adopting section 5 of the Restatement Third,
Justice Goldberg proceeded to examine if the facts of the present
case precluded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 30
Justice Goldberg found that the record indicated that Colmar
might have been a substantial participant in the integration of
NEED's system.31 Therefore, the trial judge erred by entering
summary judgment in favor of Colmar.32 As for EPT, Justice
Goldberg found that there was no evidence that EPT had any par-
ticipation in the integration of its product into the system at
23. See id. at 928.
24. See Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 715.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 716 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts § 5 (1998)).
28. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 5 (1998).
29. See id.
30. See Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 716.
31. See id. at 716-17.
32. See id. at 717.
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NEED.33 However, Justice Goldberg did find a basis for reversing
the summary judgment order as to EPT as well.34
One of Buonanno's arguments below was that EPT failed to
employ a reasonable alternative design for the pulley it manufac-
tured.35 If Buonanno was able to prove this at trial, the product
could be considered defective at the time it left EPT's control.36
Thus EPT could be found liable under section 2(b) of the Restate-
ment Third.37 Therefore, Justice Goldberg concluded that
Buonanno's reasonable alternative design argument precluded
summary judgement as to EPT.38
The Majority
Chief Justice Weisberger, joined by Justice Bourcier and Jus-
tice Lederberg, wrote the opinion for the majority.39 The majority
adopted Justice Goldberg's opinion with respect to Colmar in its
entirety, but concluded that the trial justice properly granted sum-
mary judgment with respect to EPT.40
The majority found that EPT could not be liable under the new
Restatement.41 First, as Justice Goldberg recognized, EPT was
not a substantial participant in the integration of the completed
conveyor belt system. 42 Second, EPT could not be liable for failure
to warn since no defect existed at the time the component part left
EPT's control.43 Third, contrary to Justice Goldberg's finding, the
court held that there was no evidence to support EPT's liability
under the reasonable alternative design argument because EPT
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts states that a prod-
uct is defective when:
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the prod-
uct not reasonably safe.
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b) (1998).
38. See Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 717-18.
39. See id. at 718.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
could not anticipate how NEED would implement the compo-
nent." The court made clear that the primary duty to ensure
product safety in the workplace rested on NEED's shoulders and
that EPT could not reasonably anticipate the design preferences of
the industry.45 As there was no genuine issue of material fact left
for the jury to decide, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
decision granting summary judgment in favor of EPT.46
Justice Flanders' Opinion
Justice Flanders concurred with the decision of the court with
respect to Colmar, but dissented from the majority's opinion up-
holding summary judgment for EPT.47 The majority held that
EPT could not be liable under a failure to warn theory because it
could not foresee NEED's dangerous integration of the part.48 Jus-
tice Flanders found this nonsensical.49 The parties agreed at oral
argument that a nip point is inherently dangerous without a
guard. EPT also conceded that the only foreseeable use of the pul-
ley is as a component part of a conveyor belt system. Therefore,
Justice Flanders held it must follow that the pulley will always be
unreasonably dangerous absent a guard, and that a warning would
remedy this situation.50 Under section 2 of the Restatement Third,
failure to warn of an unreasonably dangerous product is a basis for
liability.51 Thus, the trial court should not have granted summary
judgment in favor of EPT. 52
CONCLUSION
Although the facts of this case spawned three separate opin-
ions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court unanimously agreed that
component part manufacturers and distributors cannot escape lia-
bility for product-caused harm by arguing that no duty exists. By
adopting section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the
supreme court ensured that manufacturers and sellers of compo-
44. See id.
45. See id. at 719.
46. See id. at 719-20.
47. See id. at 720.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 (1998).
52. See Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 721.
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nent parts will not escape liability for the harm caused by their
products where they substantially participate in the integration of
those parts into a final product, or where the component part is
defective itself.
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